We study whether and how frequent-flyer program members change their purchase behaviors as they progress towards achieving elite status. We find that as travelers stretch to attain status with the airline, they become more likely to choose it even when it is less appealing than its competitors. They also become more willing to pay higher prices than they otherwise would. Consumers are sophisticated about when to make such tradeoffs. If their progress falls significantly behind the pace required to attain status by the end of the year, such that their chances of attaining status seem low, they are less likely to sacrifice current utility. If their progress is substantially ahead of the target pace, they are also less likely to sacrifice utility. We document a stronger willingness to pay response among business travelers than among leisure travelers. Moral hazard explains a substantial part of the response differences between business and leisure travelers. Across all members, it accounts for one-third of the increase in willingness to pay in response to making progress towards attaining status. We estimate that companies would save at least 7% on their travel costs if their employees did not exhibit moral hazard. Overall, our results suggest a significant role of moral hazard in the success of frequent-flyer status incentives.
Introduction
Many loyalty programs across the service sector offer additional benefits to customers whose purchases with the company qualify them for an elite status. The airline industry offers a canonical example: elite status on frequent-flyer programs.
1 Travelers with an elite frequent-flyer status with an airline enjoy additional perks such as increased probability of upgrades, lower baggage fees, more generous baggage allowances, priority check-in, and priority boarding every time they fly with the airline. Frequent-flyer programs have been hypothesized to help airlines price discriminate, and create behavioral loyalty by inducing switching costs.
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By targeting the decision-maker rather than the payer, loyalty programs may also help airlines by taking advantage of moral hazard, a principal-agent problem between the company paying for travel and the employees benefiting from the frequent-flyer program benefits.
3 Despite a rich theoretical discussion regarding the impact of frequent-flyer programs, and the central role of consumer response to reward incentives in these discussions, whether and how consumers change their purchase behaviors in order to achieve status is an open empirical question. consumers change their purchase behavior due to status incentives. We show that consumers become more willing to pay higher ticket prices and/or to accept less appealing flight options as they make progress towards their status goal. We also show that business travelers exhibit a greater increase in their willingness to pay than leisure travelers. Finally, we document a substantial role of moral hazard in the success of frequent-flyer programs.
We arrive at these conclusions by studying the transactional histories and point accumulations of 3.5 million frequent-flyer program members during the 2010 and 2011 point-earning cycles. As with any other company database, the data do not include information on whether the member traveled with another airline, took a train, or did not travel when the member did not purchase from the airline. We propose a novel inference strategy that uses a minimal set of assumptions to identify changes in consumer valuations in the absence of data on consumer choices of competitive alternatives. First, we assume that product offerings and prices on a given route, at a given time, do not respond to an individual consumer's purchase history and point accumulation with the airline. Second, we assume that after controlling for weekly seasonality, variations in a traveler's preferences over attributes of air travel (e.g., price, convenience, service quality) are independent of changes in her progress towards status attainment. Thus, we use systematic changes in the selection of booking attributes that appear in the company database to infer how travelers' preferences for the airline versus other travel options change as they make progress towards attaining elite status. The richness of the member panel allows us to control for common variations over time in travel preferences and flight options, as well as individual preference heterogeneity that may otherwise produce a spurious correlation between point accumulation and purchase behaviors.
In two specifications, we test whether travelers' willingness to stick with the airline increases as they stretch to attain status. First, we examine changes in travelers' willingness to book with the airline when it offers less appealing flight options relative to its competition. Specifically, we test whether members become more likely to book with the airline on routes where the airline has lower market share than its competitors.
We find that they do. Second, we examine changes in prices travelers pay relative to the prices others pay on the same flight. This allows us to control for the type of routes and flights travelers book with the airline.
We find that loyalty program members on average show an 8% increase in price paid compared to others taking the same flight, as they stretch to attain status. These findings suggest that tiered incentives are successful in creating significant switching costs for travelers on the path to attaining status.
We find that loyalty program members are sophisticated about when to forego more desirable alternatives in favor of the airline. If their point accumulation over time is significantly behind or significantly ahead of the pace required to attain status, they are less likely to make an effort to stick with the airline. In addition, members' increased willingness to stick with the airline resets when they transition from the end of one pointaccumulation cycle to the beginning of another. These findings are consistent with the behavior of forwardlooking travelers who trade off current losses from forgoing a desirable alternative versus the increased chances of attaining status, as modeled by Kopalle et al. (2012) . Also, these non-monotonic responses rule out alternative explanations based on spurious serial correlation, learning and/or habit formation from cumulative experience with the airline.
We find that business travelers exhibit a greater increase than leisure travelers in their willingness to pay as they make progress towards the status. 4 There could be several reasons for this difference. The first is traveler heterogeneity. That is, regardless of the type of trip, business travelers may be less price sensitive and/or value achieving status more, therefore show a more pronounced response to progress towards status, irrespective of who pays for the ticket. The second reason is trip-type heterogeneity: Travelers may be less flexible and less price sensitive for business trips than for leisure trips. If business travelers are increasingly likely to take business trips as they stretch to attain status, then it might be the trip-type heterogeneity that drives the cross-member differences we document. The third reason is moral hazard: Business travelers may have a stronger willingness-to-pay response because their companies pay for their travel while they get to enjoy the perks of attaining status. One might expect this effect to be attenuated when travelers are paying out of pocket (i.e., when traveling for leisure).
Following this observation, we provide evidence for the role of moral hazard by examining differences in the extent to which travelers react to status incentives when they are traveling for business versus leisure. In this analysis, we account for preference heterogeneity across members by allowing baseline willingness to pay for business and leisure travel to vary at the individual level. As expected, how much a member's willingness to pay increases as she makes progress towards status depends on the purpose of the trip. In particular, we see a larger increase in a given member's willingness to pay when she is booking business trips. Overall, one-third of the increase in the average consumer's willingness to pay in the marketplace can be attributed to moral hazard. If moral hazard could be eliminated, our estimates suggest that companies would save at least 7% of their travel costs.
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides evidence for the degree of sacrifice consumers are willing to make to travel with the sponsor airline as they make progress towards attaining status, and how consumer responses vary across the leisure and business traveler segments. Section 3.3 details the industry and our data, and Section 4 presents these results. Second, it contributes to the debate about the extent to which moral hazard is responsible for the success of frequent-flyer programs. Section 5 presents these results. Third, it addresses the challenge of identifying consumer valuation changes when the database covers consumers' transactions with only one company in a competitive landscape. We propose a strategy to infer changes in consumer valuations from the changes in booking characteristics that get differentially selected into the database, exploiting the fact that the supply of competitive options does not respond to an individual's point accumulation. We discuss the merits of this strategy in the context of previous approaches in the next section. We hope that this approach proves useful in assessing the impact of other customer relationship or loyalty programs.
Related Literature
Both tier-based and frequency-based loyalty programs are widespread practices in the service industry.
Frequency-based programs take on the form of "collect X points, get a reward", and tier-based programs take on the form of "collect X points, qualify for a membership tier." The marketing literature has devoted considerable attention to measuring the impact of frequency-based reward programs on several indicators of loyalty, such as increased customer retention (e.g., Verhoef, 2003; Lewis, 2004; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2018) , purchase frequency (e.g., Hartmann and Viard, 2008; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2018; Kopalle et al., 2012; Rossi, 2017; Zhang and Breugelmans, 2012) , reward redemption (e.g., Lal and Bell, 2003) , customer traffic (e.g., Dreze and Hoch, 1998) , customer expenditures (e.g., Dreze and Hoch, 1998; Lal and Bell, 2003; Leenheer et al., 2007) , and attitudinal measures (e.g., Bolton et al., 2000) .
5
In contrast to the rich empirical literature on frequency-based reward programs, empirical investigations of how consumers change their behaviors in response to tier-based loyalty programs are sparse. Kopalle et al. (2012) show that loyalty program members' propensity to stay at a hotel chain increases as they progress towards the requirement threshold for attaining elite status with the sponsor hotel. In the context of the airline industry, Dreze and Nunes (2011) argue that travelers are more likely to fly with the airline after achieving the highest status tier. Our paper contributes to this nascent literature by documenting how travelers change their choices as they progress towards attaining status with an airline.
Our paper departs from the focus on booking frequencies. It studies the changes in consumers' willingness to pay and the characteristics of the trips consumers' are willing to take with the airline. This departure is driven by two factors. First, we are interested in these behavioral changes, as they allow us to study product 5 Breugelmans et al. (2015) offer a comprehensive discussion of the existing research on loyalty programs.
and price tradeoffs members become more likely to make. Second, the assumption that enables inference based on changes in booking frequencies is unlikely to hold in our setting. In order to identify the underlying changes in a member's valuations by changes in the frequency of a member's bookings with the airline, we would have to assume that a member's probability of travel is independent of her past (cumulative) travel in a given year. This assumption is likely to be violated in air travel, because most travelers have a time and/or monetary budget for travel: If member travels very frequently for a period of time, she may be less likely to travel as frequently in periods that follow. Therefore, our inference strategy, which relates changes in the characteristics of bookings a member makes with the airline to changes in her valuation, does not rely on this assumption. Instead, it relies on the assumption that a member's preferences regarding travel attributes (e.g. price, convenience, quality of service) are independent of her past (cumulative) travel in a given year. This inference strategy provides an alternative approach for identifying the causal impact of making progress in a loyalty program on consumer valuations.
Our empirical approach also addresses other inference problems highlighted by previous investigations of loyalty programs. Gopalakrishnan et al. (2018) underscore the importance of controlling for individual preference heterogeneity in order to identify causal responses to a frequency-based loyalty program. The ability to do so is also crucial in order to avoid the potential selection bias arising from systematically different purchasing patterns across members whose past travel accumulations differ. The panel nature of our data allows us to conduct within-member analyses to control for preference heterogeneity in a flexible manner. In the context of the hotel industry, Kopalle et al. (2012) discuss the importance of seasonality in price evolution and expectations and allow for quarterly variations. In our empirical approach, we have the flexibility to be able to include weekly controls that account for common demand and supply variations.
Controlling for these common unobservables is important to avoid potential confounds arising from structural changes in price distributions and/or willingness to travel with the airline that are correlated with time and therefore with overall point accumulation.
An important contribution of our paper is to provide evidence for the role of moral hazard in the context of loyalty programs. In this regard, Rossi (2017) is closest to our work. In the context of gasoline purchases, Rossi (2017) provides suggestive evidence of moral hazard by documenting a group of travelers who extract more value from one dollar's worth of rewards than from one dollar spent for gasoline. While this finding is suggestive of moral hazard, Rossi points out the importance of knowing whether the segment of consumers with such valuations are business travelers, which his empirical context does not allow. In our empirical context, we can proxy for the purpose of the trip, and characterize member heterogeneity based on members'
propensity to travel for business. More importantly, we can identify how a member's purchase behaviors vary across business and leisure trips, and how this difference evolves as the member makes progress towards attaining status. Therefore, we can identify the impact of moral hazard on members' responses separately from preference heterogeneity.
We also contribute to the literature on frequent-flyer programs. Despite a rich theoretical literature 6 debating the impact of such programs on airline profitability and competition, empirical investigations of these programs have been sparse. Lederman (2007 Lederman ( , 2008 examines market price reactions to airline alliance expansions to infer that the value consumers derive from frequent-flyer programs increases in the program's network due to the increased ability to earn and redeem frequency-based rewards. Two survey based studies report that frequent-flyer program membership influences respondents' airline choice (Proussaloglou and Koppelman, 1995) and willingness to pay (Hess et al., 2007) . We add to this literature by examining individuals' actual booking behaviors to infer how consumers' switching costs change as they make progress towards attaining elite status.
Finally, we recognize that frequent-flyer members may also be motivated by psychological reasons. For example, the mere perceived progress hypothesis (Nunes and Dreze, 2006) and the goal gradient hypothesis (Kivetz et al., 2006) predict that consumer valuations increase as consumers make progress towards their status goal. Our results are consistent with these general predictions. However, a rational model of forwardlooking consumers better reflects the totality of our findings, because members' responses vary with not only the amount of points they accumulated, but also the timing of these accumulations. In particular, we find that travelers scale back their efforts when their progress is faster than the pace required to attain their goal.
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That said, we caution that our findings should be interpreted as evidence against these psychological accounts, because these accounts aim to explain the motivational impact of frequency-based rewards. Therefore, it is inappropriate to judge their validity in the context of tier-based loyalty programs that feature a deadline by which point should be accumulated.
3 Industry Details and Data Summary
Industry Details
The U.S. airline industry accounts for more than 10 million American jobs and 5 cents of every dollar of U.S. GDP. Currently, the airlines with the largest market share in the U. Prior research has documented price and convenience (e.g., number of departures and service directness)
as two of the main factors determining consumers' choices across carriers on a route. A carrier may be very competitive on one or both of these dimensions and therefore command a large marketshare on one route, while lagging behind its competitors on another route. Legacy airlines (American, Delta, and United) operate in a hub-and-spoke system, which has initially given them different strengths across geographies.
Over time, both legacy and low-cost carriers (Spirit, JetBlue, and Southwest) have expanded their networks, leading to more overlap in routes served. Still, large differences remain in the relative appeal of these carriers' services across different routes. Loyalty programs may allow airlines to hold on to customers on routes where they are otherwise not very competitive.
In 1981, American Airlines launched what many consider to be the first airline loyalty program; it was quickly followed by Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and Continental Airlines. Twenty-five years after this launch, the world's frequent-flyer programs boasted more than 180 million members, 120 million of whom were U.S. residents. Frequent-flyer programs offer two simultaneous reward systems: frequency rewards (reward miles) and tiered rewards (elite status). Members earn reward miles or points either by flying or by spending with a program-affiliated company (e.g. a credit card, hotel, etc.) that has partnered with an airline. The reward miles can be redeemed for airline tickets, seat upgrades, purchases with affiliated programs and companies, etc. By 2005, a total of 14 trillion un-redeemed frequent-flyer points had been accumulated by travelers worldwide. 10 Airlines periodically devalue reward miles by increasing the number of required miles for free tickets and other rewards, and by making it harder to redeem them. 11 Perhaps because of the growing accumulation of unredeemed miles in members' accounts, frequent travelers have become more interested in achieving status. For example, Forbes argues "Originally, the goal was to accrue free travel, but that has changed dramatically in today's aviation landscape, and most frequent-flyers these days are more interested in status than the occasional free ticket" (Larry Olmsted, Forbes, January 23, 2013 ). In the hotel industry, which offers similar loyalty programs, Kopalle et al. (2012) also find that a large number of the loyalty program members are motivated mainly by achieving status rather than by 10 These statistics are obtained from webflyer.com. According to The Economist (https://www.economist.com/leaders/2005/01/06/in-terminal-decline), airlines sold frequent-flyer points to credit-card firms at an average of just under 2 cents a mile in 2005. Their value when used to buy a ticket or to upgrade to business class ranged between 1 cent and over 10 cents per mile. The Economist used the mid-point of this range to calculate the global stock of frequent-flyer miles outstanding in 2005 to be worth $700 billion U.S. dollars. Outstanding redeemable miles are so large that, by another calculation offered by Bhaskara (2015), Delta's aggregate liability amounted to $3.9 billion, United's to $4.9 billion, and American's to $2.6 billion.
11 For a recent discussion, please see this recent article: http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-frequent-flier-programs-20170914-story.html collecting reward points. Our study only focuses on the tiered elite status aspect of frequent-flyer programs.
Status Tiers, Point-Earning Cycles and Progress
The frequent-flyer programs of all legacy U.S. airlines feature a tiered status structure. Each calendar year, members must accumulate a required amount of travel between January 1st and December 31st to achieve status. If a member attains the required points before the end of the year, she can start enjoying status benefits at the moment of status attainment and continue to do so for the following calendar year. The three leading legacy airlines, American, United and Delta Airlines, all offer four tiers, with the first three tiers having the same status-qualifying point requirements of 25,000, 50,000, and 75,000 miles. The entry-level status tier (tier 1, from here on) is the Gold tier in American Airlines and the Silver tier in Delta and United Airlines. Our analyses focus on the impact of progress towards tier 1 on consumer choices.
We make this choice for two main reasons. First, tier 1 is the only relevant goal for a large majority of travelers. Second, rules governing tier 1 help us identify consumer valuation dynamics in response to progress towards attaining status. While points attained during one cycle do not roll over to the next cycle if the member fails to achieve tier 1, travelers keep all their accumulated status-qualifying miles if they fall short of achieving higher tiers. This all-or-nothing nature of tier 1 means that failing to achieve tier 1 is associated with the largest opportunity costs across all tiers. Furthermore, the fact that travelers can hold onto their points if they fail to achieve higher tiers creates additional dynamics that interfere with our research question.
For example, a traveler who expects not to travel much in the following year can purposefully stop traveling with TA short of achieving tier 3 and roll over her miles to the next cycle, because she may value achieving tier 2 in both years more than achieving tier 3 the first year and falling back to being without status the following year. Finally, airlines differ in their rules governing higher tiers, so we cannot easily discuss these tiers without revealing TA's identity. For all these reasons, we focus our attention on the impact of tier 1 status incentives.
The industry defines point-earning cycles based on calendar year and the timing of tier attainment.
Given our focus on tier 1, the point-earning cycles can be defined as follows: At the beginning of 2010, travelers in our data are at the beginning of the 2010 cycle. If they fail to achieve tier 1 in 2010, they lose their accumulated points at the end of 2010 and begin a new point-earning cycle on Jan 1, 2011. If they attain tier 1 in 2010, they begin accumulating points for the 2011 point-earning cycle immediately upon obtaining tier 1 status, because additional points over 25,000 roll over to the next year's account. We calculate the accumulation of status-qualifying miles for each member in each point-earning cycle using the point accumulation rules of the airline we obtained data from (TA, from here on, to protect the identity of the airline).
12 Point accumulation accounting can be done based on booked flights or flown flights. Since the consumer knows the flights she booked, booked points better reflect her sense of progress towards the point requirements.
Intuitively, the degree to which point accumulation impacts the probability of achieving tier 1 status should depend on when those points are accumulated. A consumer who has accumulated 10,000 points by
December is unlikely to reach tier 1 status in the remaining time. On the other hand, a consumer who has the same number of points in March still has a decent chance. Because a forward-looking consumer is expected to respond to her chances of attaining status, we expect the timing of point accumulation to matter for how consumers respond to accumulated points.
We construct a measure of progress that directly takes timing into account. This measure compares the member's average rate of earning up to this purchase with a constant rate of point accumulation that would achieve tier 1 by the end of the calendar year. Note that a constant pace of progress towards a 25,000-point threshold over 52 weeks requires an average accumulation of 480.7 points per week. We define
. When the consumer makes the first booking in a point-earning cycle, unless she has rollover points from the previous cycle, she starts with zero accumulated points and a progress value of -1. If the member accumulates exactly the number of points required for a steady speed of progress towards reaching 25,000 by the end of the year, the progress measure is zero; if the member is "behind" schedule, the progress measure is negative; if the member is "ahead," the progress measure is positive.
Therefore, a member's progress metric can be low even if she has a large amount of accumulated points, if there is little time left to the end of the year. Similarly, it can be high if the member accumulated a modest amount of points early in the year. Figure 1 plots the progress measure and the accumulated points for a particular member. As demonlonger than 500 miles. For routes shorter than 500 miles, the base points are equal to 500. At different points in time, airlines also allowed limited ways in which travelers to earn tier-qualifying points through other types of purchases. In addition, Delta added revenue-based elite status requirements in January 2014, United in March 2015, and American Airlines in August, 2016. Our data come from 2010-2011, years before these changes were announced. In Section 6 we discuss how the new spending thresholds are likely impact consumers, airlines and employers in light of our findings. strated in Figure 1 , progress is positive when the points earned by the person accelerate beyond (approximately) 480 points per week, which is tracked by the 45-degree line. Progress is negative (positive) when the point accumulation falls below (rises above) the 45-degree line. This figure demonstrates the non-monotonic changes in progress over time, while point accumulation increases monotonically. This is a desirable feature.
While point accumulation is necessarily increasing as the traveler books more trips within the calendar year, the level of progress depends on whether the member is keeping up the pace towards the goal. Table 1 reports the distribution of cumulative booked points and progress of the members in our sample at the time they make each of their bookings. On average, members' progress is behind the target pace required to attain status by 54% of that pace. The median booking is associated with an instance where the member is 81% behind the target pace. This is driven by the fact that 33% of observations associated with the first booking in a point earning cycle where accumulated points are zero and progress equals -1.The distribution statistics indicate a long tail of instances indicate booking occasions where travelers can be significantly ahead of schedule. The 95th percentile of the progress distribution is an instance where the member is ahead of the target pace required to attain status by 57% of that pace. In Section 4, we present results based on this progress metric. We also show the congruence of these results with results from a specification using accumulated points in Section 4.3.
Data Summary
We rely on two data sources for our empirical investigation: a proprietary dataset of all booking records The Airline Origin and Destination Survey Databank 1B (DB1B) provides a 10% random sample of airline passenger tickets on domestic routes. The data are reported at the quarterly level. We use this data to obtain number of ticketing carriers, their market shares and average prices on the routes the TA serves.
The DB1B data allow us to construct quarterly route characteristics to describe how TA's flight offerings compared to those of its competitors.
Members
We construct panel data of transactions for a sample of active members who made bookings on at least two different points in at least one of the two years. This selection is necessary to conduct within-member empirical analyses. Among active members, there are 3.8 million members whose point accumulation can be calculated without ambiguity, because they first appear in the database without any tier status, and therefore do not have any (unobserved) rollover point from a previous year. In order to study the behavior of members who are likely to be motivated primarily by achieving tier 1 rather than higher tiers, we further limit our attention to members who did not accumulate more than 35,000 status-qualifying miles in a given year.
14 The final data sample consists 3,489,102 active members. Table 2 reports statistics that elucidate the differences across the purchase patterns of members in our sample over two years. The average member books 5.9 routes over 3 booking occasions per year, and accumulates around 9,756 status-qualifying miles per year; however, there is a long tail of members who book more frequently and accumulate many more points. Members reach 15,000 points 20% of the time, and achieve tier 1 status 5% of the time. The average member takes leisure trips 66% of the time, but 18% of members book only business trips and 47% book only leisure trips. Members vary in their propensity to book on TA's website across trips: The average member books on TA.com 46% of the time, but 27% of members only book on TA.com website and 36% never do. Our analyses will account for cross-member heterogeneity in a flexible manner.
Booking Characteristics
As we discussed, our empirical analyses examine changes in purchase behavior at the level of route booking decisions. We consider the decision unit to be at the route level because travelers may make different tradeoffs on the outbound and inbound routes of a roundtrip. A route booking by individual i is identified by the date the booking was made, t, and the date of departure for all segments on the route, τ . 15 The top panel of Table   3 reports summary statistics of several characteristics of route bookings. A route is defined as direct if it consists of only one segment. It is defined as international if either the origin or the destination of the route is outside of the 50 states of the U.S. and Washington, D.C. Thirteen percent of routes in our sample are international, and 59% of all routes are direct. Forty-five percent of the routes are booked directly on TA's own website. We merge in geographic coordinates of each airport to calculate the distance flown between any pair or airports. 16 The average distance traveled on a route is 1,412 miles, and the average number of status-qualifying points earned is 1,666. This number is higher than the average distance due to the fact 14 Our results are not affected by this cutoff. Maximum cutoffs of 30,000 and 40,000 points produce similar results. Results are available upon request.
15 The airline's database records transactions at the segment level, because ticket coupons are issued for each flight segment on an itinerary. We construct routes by connecting segments that are booked together and depart on the same date. We construct itineraries in order to determine whether each route is a part of a one-way trip or a roundtrip, and if it is a roundtrip, whether it spans a Saturday night. Route and itinerary construction details are included in the Appendix. 16 The geographic coordinates can be found at openflights.org. The shortest flight distance of 11 miles corresponds to a flight between two islands in the Pacific Ocean, operated by one of TA's international partners.
that a multiplier larger than one is effective for full-fare coach and all first-class ticket purchases. Only 3.6% of route bookings involve at least one flight in first-class, and 65% of routes involve at least one flight with a discount fare in the coach-class.
The top panel of Table 3 also reports characteristics of the itineraries each route booking is associated with. We define itineraries by connecting routes that are booked on the same day based on their departure and arrival cities. Roundtrips are defined as itineraries that loop back to the same city they originated from, and account for 79% of the bookings. On average, consumers book their travel about 36 days before the outbound departure date. For roundtrips, we define trip duration as the number of days between departure and return dates, which is 6 days for the average booking in the sample. In keeping with the industry practice, we classify a roundtrip trip as a leisure trip if it includes a Saturday-night stay-over, and as a business trip otherwise. Only roundtrip itineraries can be classified in this manner, since we need to observe a return date. Leisure trips account for 60% of all roundtrip bookings. This classification also captures other booking characteristics that are correlated with business travel. For example, advance booking is 27 days longer for leisure trips than for business trips (p-value < .001), and trip length is 5.4 days shorter for business trips than for leisure trips (p-value < .001). Also, routes associated with leisure trips are more likely to involve discounted tickets (77%, vs. 51%, p-value < .001). These patterns suggest that Saturday-night stay-over is a sensible proxy for the purpose of the trip.
The revenues accrued by TA, and reported in the database, equal the price that the airline charged minus any surcharges or taxes and fees collected by the government. We calculate the revenues TA obtains from each route booking by adding up its segment revenues.
17 The middle panel of Table 3 reports the distribution of these prices broken down by class and international/domestic categories across the 24,862,671 route bookings that are in our final sample.
18
The average coach class revenue per member on a domestic route is $191, and the average first class revenue is $527. Note that these revenues are about half of the revenues that TA obtains from a roundtrip itinerary. On international routes, the average revenue from a first-class route booking is $1,757, and from a coach-class route booking is $428. We would like to highlight two stark features of the price distribution.
First, the first-class revenue distribution has little overlap with the coach-class revenue distribution. Second, price outliers at the low end of the price distribution seem to include revenues from tickets that are partially 17 Consider a route from LAX to DFW, with a connection in SLC. The traveler pays $286 including $41 of taxes and fees. Therefore, the total revenue to TA is $245, reported in the database as $94 for the LAX-SLC segment, and $151 for the SLC-DFW segment. We aggregate these revenues to the route level to get to the $245 number. Karlsson et al. (2004) estimate that the effective tax rate on the average base fare was 10.9% in 1993 and 15.5% in 2002. Within the contiguous 50 states, these charges include the U.S. domestic transportation tax (7.5%), the U.S. federal flight segment fee ($3.80), the September 11 security fee (up to $5.00, $2.50 per segment), and a passenger facility charge (up to $4.50). There were no significant changes to these taxes and fees during the time period our data span.
18 In total, there are 24,984,523 route bookings in our data. However, the database includes some segments with negative and zero revenues. These observations are likely to reflect refunds, compensations or award bookings. Therefore, miles flown on these segments do not contribute to point accumulation towards status. Routes that include irregular prices, defined as being less than $1, account for 0.25% of the routes bookings in the sample. There are another 0.06% route bookings that were made on flights where the median revenue was not positive, suggesting that a majority of the passengers were refunded and or compensated. We do not consider these route bookings in any of our analyses. Therefore, Table 3 reports summary statistics of 24,862,671 routes that are permitted in our analyses.
funded with points or refunds (revenues lower than $15 account for 0.4% of the observations). For simplicity, we focus on coach-class bookings with positive revenues in our main analyses of these data. In the Appendix, we present additional results from data samples that exclude revenues lower than $15, and from specifications that include first-class prices. Our findings remain the same.
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports summary statistics of the competitive landscape on each route at the booking level. We create these these external data moments from DB1B, as described in detail in the Appendix. We match these data to the transaction database at the route-quarter level. The merge covers 99% of all domestic bookings in our data sample. Across domestic bookings, on average, TA has 2.8 competitors and 55% market share. Four percent of the bookings are made on routes that TA serves as a monopolist. On average, TA is slightly more expensive than other carriers.
Purchase Behavior Response to Progress Towards Status
We examine the impact of within-person changes in progress towards tier 1 on purchase behavior. Our objective is to infer the types of tradeoffs consumers become willing to make when stretching to attain status. If switching costs are increasing as a member makes progress towards attaining status, members should become more willing to book trips with TA even when it is less appealing that its competition. A corollary of this assertion is that members should become more willing to pay higher prices to fly with TA.
Airlines' flight options and prices do not respond to an individual traveler's purchase history and point accumulation with TA. As a result, after controlling for demand and supply conditions common to all travelers, systematic changes in the characteristics of a traveler's bookings with TA associated with changes in her progress towards tier 1 can inform us about the impact of progress on her booking choices.
We conduct two main investigations that test whether travelers' willingness to stick with the airline increases as they stretch to attain status. To test whether the consumers become more likely to pay higher prices than they otherwise would, we examine changes in the relative price differential the member pays with respect to other passengers on the same flight. To examine changes in members' willingness to book TA on a route where it offers less appealing options relative to its competition, we test whether members become more likely to book TA on routes where TA has lower relative market share. In this section, we present these analyses before discussing several robustness checks and exploring response heterogeneity across business and leisure travelers.
Increased willingness to book TA even when it has lower appeal
Airlines that offer lower prices, better connection options and/or higher frequency of service command a higher marketshare compared to competitors on a route. Therefore, on routes where TA has lower relative market share, TA is likely to be charging higher prices, offering less desirable flight options, or both. In competitive markets, we would expect travelers in general to be less likely to book with TA on routes where TA has lower appeal in the market. However, as travelers become more motivated to fly with TA, we expect their propensity of booking TA on these routes to increase. This change would reflect on the transaction database in terms of an increase in the probability of bookings on routes where TA has lower general appeal.
We associate each booking consumer i makes with TA's relative appeal on the route she is traveling on.
Each booking is identified by the time of booking, t, the time of departure τ and the route r. To capture TA's appeal on a route, we use the quarterly DB1B data to define TA's relative market share on route r in quarter q associated with the departure date of τ as a proxy for its market appeal with respect to its competitors serving the same route. In particular, we calculate the normalized deviation of TA's marketshare from the average marketshare on the route: RM S rq = s T A,rq −srq srq where s rq is the average marketshare and s T A,rq is TA's marketshare on the route. This metric captures the relative appeal of TA vis-a-vis its competitors better than market share does. For example, on route 1, TA may be the trailing one of two competitors, commanding a 30% marketshare, and on route 2, it may be the leading airline out of eight competitors, commanding a 25% marketshare. Even though route 2 is more competitive and TA has lower market share, TA has a higher relative appeal compared to its competitors in route 2 than in route 1. Congruently, on route 1, TA's relative marketshare is −.4, reflecting the fact that its market share is 40% lower than the average share on the route. On route 2, TA's relative marketshare is 1, reflecting the fact that its market share is double the average share on the route.
Our analyses aim to analyze changes in individual's booking decisions. Recall that a booking b by individual i is identified by the date the booking was made, t, and the date of departure for all segments on the route, τ . We merge in route-quarter level descriptors RM S rq to describe each booking in terms of the market appeal TA has on the route of that booking in the quarter of the booking departure date.
In this manner, we obtain RM S ib(tτ ) for each booking observation. Table 4 presents summary statistics of RM S ib(tτ ) . On average, members make bookings on routes where TA's market share is 2.56 times the average carrier's market share, although this relative market share metric spans a large range. At one extreme, TA has negligible market share against a competitor who is a monopolist, i.e., its relative market share is close to -1. At the other extreme, TA's market share is 7.1 times the average market share on the route.
In order to test whether the bookings made by a member are on routes where TA has exceedingly lower appeal compared to its competition as she makes progress toward attaining status, we estimate the following regression:
where RM S ib(tτ ) refers to TA's relative marketshare on route r in quarter q associated with a booking that member i made at time t to travel at time τ . While the unit of observation is at the individual i and booking b level, we carry the (tτ ) as a reminder that each booking is associated with two dates: a booking date t and a departure date τ . Because booking decisions are made at time t, we explore whether the progress of the decision-maker at time t impacts her choices. On the other hand, we include week fixed effects for departure times of the bookings, ν τ , in order to account for common unobservables that impact choices associated with travel at that time. For example, in certain times of the year, TA may have a different service schedule on some routes, increasing their popularity. Or, members may be more likely to travel on certain routes during certain times of the year. Demand and supply fluctuations across the year that impact the likelihood of all travelers to choose TA on certain routes regardless of their progress towards status are captured by these fixed effects. In addition, we include intercepts for each individual, α i , to control for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences.
To capture potential nonlinearities in travelers' responses, we transform the continuous progress metric into a categorical predictors by discretizing it into ranges of S k . S 0 includes the 33% percent of the observations associated with the first booking in a cycle, where progress equals -1, and serves as the reference level.
Other S k 's are characterized by the following progress values as cutoff points: −.9, −.8, −.7, −.55, −.3, .1, .6. These cutoffs correspond to the 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, 90th and 95th percentiles of the progress distribution, and the maximum value of progress is the upper-bound. The set of coefficients β k reflect the degree to which a within-person change in progress leads to a within-person change in the willingness to choose TA over its competition on routes characterized by TA's relative market share.
We expect TA's relative marketshare to be lower on routes the member books when the member is more motivated to fly with TA. This is because the member is trading off between a utility sacrifice in the current period versus the increased probability of attaining status by the deadline in the future (e.g. Kopalle, 2012) . In this forward-looking framework, the member's incentives to sacrifice current utility is low when her chances of attaining status are low, because even if she exerted effort to stick with the airline, these efforts are unlikely to push her over the threshold required to attain status. As Figure ? ? in Section 3.2 demonstrates, a member's chances of attaining status increase rapidly beyond the 60-70th percentile of the progress metric, as the member comes close to being within reach of making the required pace of progress towards her goal. Therefore, we would expect β k to increase in magnitude (becoming more negative) as progress increases. However, at some point, when the member feels that she is significantly ahead of the pace that is required to attain status, the member may scale back her efforts. We would expect it to happen when progress is positive (i.e., in S 7 and/or S 8 regions), because positive values of progress indicate that the individual is collecting points at a faster rate than what is required for attaining their goal.
Before we present the results, we caution the reader that β k estimates are likely to be biased downwards due to two sources of measurement error. First, the progress metric is only a proxy for member's expectations, since expectations are inherently unobservable. Second, our analyses regarding RM S rely on quarterly and aggregate moments from external data. While these moments allow us to understand consumer tradeoffs between the TA and its competition even when we do not observe the exact competitive options consumers considered, they also introduce noise. The noise inherent in either of these proxies is a source of unbiased measurement error. Due to this noise, we expect an attenuation bias in our estimates.
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the β k estimates from Specification 1. Figure 2 plots these coefficients.
Consistent with increased valuations for TA, the estimates show that TA's relative appeal on the routes members book with TA is lower when the member's progress comes within reach of making the required pace of progress towards her goal. In particular, compared to the reference progress level when the consumer is 100% behind the required target because she is just starting out, on routes booked with TA when the member is 80-90% behind target, TA's relative marketshare is 2.8% lower (β 2 ). On routes booked with TA when the member is 55-70% behind target, TA's relative marketshare is 6.6% lower (β 4 ). We consider the member to be within reach of making steady progress when the member's progress at progress interval k = 6 (between 30% behind target and 10% ahead of target). On routes booked with TA at that progress level, TA's relative marketshare is 9.6% lower (β 6 ). When the member's progress speed is significantly above target, TA's relative marketshare on the booked route is 9.4% lower (β 8 ). At peak motivation, TA's relative marketshare on booked routes is 10.7% lower (β 7 ). The sharp increase in the magnitude of coefficients as progress increases suggests that members are not willing to sacrifice much to fly with TA when they lag far behind, but become more willing to do so when they have more plausible chances of attaining status.
Furthermore, they scale their efforts back after reaching high levels of progress. Table 5 .
These results suggest that as they stretch to attain status, consumers become more willing to book trips with TA on routes even if it does not offer the most attractive options. Consumers with increasing willingness to stick with the TA can pay for that loyalty by booking TA even when it offers less desirable flight options than competition, when it is more expensive than its competition for what it offers, or both. The result that consumers are increasingly more likely to book on routes where TA has low appeal overall is consistent with all three of these possibilities. Next, we provide supplemental analyses that look for evidence of each of these possibilities in the aggregate data. In particular, we test whether members become more likely to book TA on routes where TA i) is more expensive relative to competition, and/or ii) offers less convenient flight options.
To examine whether consumers become more likely to choose TA on routes where the relative markup of TA's prices over its competition are higher, we define markup rq = p T A,rq −prq prq where p T A,rq is average price across tickets bought on TA's flights and p rq is the average price across all ticket sales on route r that depart in the quarter q. We merge these route-quarter descriptors to the booking data to obtain markup ib(tτ ) , which indicates TA's relative price on route r in quarter q associated with a booking that member i made at time t to travel at time τ . Table 4 presents summary statistics of this variable. Column 1 of Table 6 presents estimates from Specification 1 where the dependent variable is TA's relative price with respect to its competitors on a route (markup). When members are within the region of being on target, the results indicate that they are more likely to book TA on routes where it is more expensive than its competition. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are economically insignificant (range from .03-.08%), and unlikely to unilaterally drive the large changes in the relative marketshare of TA we documented. Therefore, we conclude that the lower market appeal of TA on routes consumers become more likely to book with TA must at least partially be driven by the undesirability of the flight alternatives it offers.
We must caution the reader. Because market prices respond to an airline's flight offerings (e.g. directness,
time of departure, frequency, capacity), on routes where TA offers less convenient flights, its equilibrium prices may be lower than its competition. Therefore, if consumers' willingness to pay is increasing, this response is likely not to be captured by an analysis that tests for changes in prices paid for TA's flights. Section 4.2 presents appropriate analyses that control for possible changes in flight characteristics to identify changes in members' willingness to pay. The above result serves as supplemental evidence to contextualize our finding, and to suggest that the decrease in the attractiveness of flights that get selected into the database is likely to be driven by consumers choosing TA even when it's less convenient.
We offer two additional pieces of corroborating evidence on this point. In Column 2 of Table 6 , we present estimates from Specification 1 where the dependent variable is TA's direct to total service passenger ratio relative to the average direct to total passenger ratio of all carriers on the route, if direct service on the route is provided by any carrier. On routes where TA's competitors' direct service is more appealing than that of TA's, this relative directness ratio is negative. The estimates show that consumers become more likely to book with TA on routes where its direct service is less desirable than its competitors. We also provide evidence that consumers become more likely to book indirect trips with TA on routes even when its competitors offer more popular direct options than TA. We define Indirect Strong, an indicator for an indirect flight being booked with TA on a route where the majority of travelers fly direct, such that some carriers have desirable direct flight options, but TA is not one of them.
19 Column 3 of Table 6 presents results from Specification 1 where the dependent variable is Indirect Strong and the estimation sample is restricted to indirect bookings. The estimates show that the propensity that an indirect flight is one that is booked with TA on a route even when there are more popular competitive direct flights increases with progress. This finding suggests that consumers become increasingly likely to prefer an indirect flight with TA over its competition even when the competition offers more popular direct flights.
We have shown that as members make progress they become more likely to choose TA on routes even when TA has lower market appeal. We also provided suggestive evidence that this shift is at least partially explained by members becoming more likely to choose TA on routes where it offers less convenient options.
In the next section, we examine whether members become more willing to choose TA at higher prices than they otherwise would, controlling for any concurrent changes in the appeal or convenience of the chosen flight.
Increased willingness to pay
In this section, we test whether members' willingness to pay to travel with TA increases as they make progress towards their goal. The fact that the type of flights members become more likely to book with TA can change as a result of increased willingness to travel with TA underscore the need to control for such changes when examining changes in consumer willingness to pay. Therefore, we assess whether the price differential the consumer pays compared to other consumers who choose the same flight responds to her progress towards status. 20 In particular, we measure the relative price differential the consumer i pays when booking at time t in comparison to others in the same cabin as RP Dib(tτ ) =
where p if is the revenue associated with individual i's ticket and p f is the median coach-class revenue obtained from all tickets sold on the same flight instance f . 21 There may be several flights the traveler takes on a booking b. This set is denoted F b . Note that all medians are constructed using the entire transaction database of TA, and therefore reflects the median prices paid by all members and non-members for coach-class tickets on a given flight. Compared to a person's general tendency of being on the upper or lower ends of the price distribution on a flight, we expect progress towards status to increase the price differential the consumer is paying. This price differential is normalized by the median, so it can be interpreted as the percentage deviation from the median. Another useful metric of price differential is normalized by distance, such that the results can be interpreted as the additional cents per mile the consumer is paying, which is useful to compare to industry standards that are reported in this manner. We define the price differential per mile as Table 4 reports the distribution of these metrics and flight price medians. We see that the average relative price differential a member in our sample pays is 35% higher than the median price charged to economy class passengers on the plane, whereas the median differential is only 3%. This distribution suggests that, as expected, the right tail of prices paid by members in our sample skew more positively than the distribution of prices paid by all passengers. The same pattern is confirmed by the price differential per mile statistics. 20 We could alternatively compare the price the consumer paid to prices on the same route and week. Studying within-flight price differential offers tighter controls for quality differences based on departure/arrival times, aircraft type, directness of service, etc.
21 A flight instance is identified by a carrier, flight number, route and departure date and time.
We examine how the price differential members pay in their bookings with the TA responds to progress with the following specification:
where the dependent variable P is either the relative price differential (RP D) or price differential per mile (P DP M ). This specification does not include departure week fixed effects, because the price differential is defined relative to prices on a flight departing at a particular date, and therefore absorbs all time and flight level unobservables. Individual fixed effects α i control for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, and the set of coefficients β k reflect the extent to which a within-person change in progress leads to a within-person change in the willingness to pay for TA. As before, S 0 includes the 33% percent of the observations associated with the first booking in a cycle and other S k 's are characterized by the following progress values as cutoff points: −.9, −.8, −.7, −.55, −.3, .1, .6. We expect an increase in the willingness to pay for TA in response to increased progress, until the point the consumer feels she can scale back her efforts.
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the estimates from Specification 2 where the dependent variable is RP D.
Compared to the price differential the member is willing to pay at the very beginning of the point accumulation cycle, the price differential she is willing to pay gradually increases, ranging from 4.7% to 7.6% (β 2 -β 5 ). It reaches its peak, 8%, at k = 6 when the member's progress falls between being 30% behind and 10% ahead of the required pace to attain status. The price differential the member is paying declines to 7% (β 7 ) and then to 5% (β 8 ) after the progress measure becomes positive. This pattern suggests substantial sophistication on the part of the travelers: They exert effort at the region when returns to effort are the highest. When they are substantially behind, such that their chances of attaining tier 1 status is low, they are less likely to pay higher prices than they otherwise would in order to fly with TA. When their progress is faster than the pace required to make steady progress, they also become less likely to pay higher prices.
Column 3 repeats the analysis with P DP M as the dependent variable, and Figure 3 plot these coefficients.
At peak motivation, when progress is close to being on track, consumers on average pay 1.95 cents more per mile compared to the median price (β 6 ). This corresponds to 8% of the average 24 cents paid per mile, or 12% of the median 16 cents paid per mile across all flights in the data. Again, we observe a nonlinearity that is consistent with the optimization of forward-looking consumers.
Prices within a flight vary for several reasons. It is well known that prices generally increase as time to departure decreases. Therefore, the increase in the price differential a traveler is willing to pay could be driven by changes in her booking time preferences. However, differences in advance booking is only one contributor to the price variation. There is significant variation in prices across ticket class types within the economy cabin, even conditional on booking time. Discounted fares have more restrictions. Higher fares are associated with more flexibility, higher chance of business class upgrades and a higher point multiplier.
Finally, due to airline revenue management practices, prices increase as a function of remaining inventory Table 5 .
of seats. The arrival of bookings for a flight may have a large random component. A flight may have more (fewer) bookings than its competitors for a given departure date, resulting its price to be higher (lower) than comparable products on the market. Finally, prices may also vary across different channels.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the more a consumer is willing to search, the more she is willing to switch to other flight option, and the earlier she books, the lower a price she is able to find in a competitive market.
As additional evidence of increased willingness to stick with the airline and forgo lower priced alternatives, we investigate whether travelers become more likely to make a booking on the airline's website (TA.com).
If the consumer makes the booking on TA.com, instead of calling an agent or originating the booking on price aggregator websites like Travelocity, she is less likely to be informed of competitors' prices. We expect consumers to be more likely to book on TA.com as their switching costs increase. In Column 4 of Table 6, we report results from Specification 1 where the dependent variable is an indicator of having originated the booking on TA.com. 22 As members progress towards attaining status in a timely manner, they become more likely to start their booking on TA.com. At k = 6, where the price differential was higher by 8%, members are 4.2% more likely to book on TA.com.
In order to examine how much of the increase in the relative price differential can be explained by changes in booking timing, we re-estimate Specification 2 while controlling for changes in a traveler's propensity to book earlier or later. In particular, similar to our construction of the relative price differential, we quantify the extent to which a traveler's advance booking departs from the median advance booking across all coachclass tickets sold on the same flight, i.e. advbook ib(tτ
where ab if indicates the number of days in advance member i made the booking, and ab f is the median advance booking across all coach-class tickets sold on flight instance f .
23 Column 5-6 of Table 6 report the results for RP D and P DP M as dependent variables, respectively. As expected, the impact of progress on the relative price differential travelers pay is more muted. This change confirms that some of the price differential arises from consumers becoming more likely to book with TA when their booking time is closer to the departure time. In Section 5 we examine the increase in the propensity of booking business trips as a driver of this shift. At this time, we highlight that even after controlling for changes in advance booking as a driver of price changes,
at peak values, we still see a 5% increase in the relative differential price and 1.38 cents increase in the differential price per mile travelers are willing to pay when they stretch to attain status (β 6 , Columns 5 and 6, respectively).
Discussion and Robustness Checks
As members make progress towards attaining status, we documented that they become more willing to book trips with TA even when it is less appealing than its competition. We also provided suggestive evidence that this shift is at least partially explained by members becoming more likely to choose TA on routes where it offers less convenient options. Furthermore, we have shown that members become more willing to pay higher prices than they otherwise would as they make progress towards their goal. In these analyses, we relied on a progress metric as a proxy for the member's perceived chances of attaining status. This metric took the timing of point accumulation into account. Previous research has used accumulated points to date as a metric for perceived proximity to status (Dreze and Nunes, 2011) . We also investigate responses to total point accumulation with the following specification:
where P T S 10 it (P T S 11 it ) refers to the number of status qualifying points member i accumulated until booking time t in the 2010 (2011) cycle, and C k index observations in each point-earning cycle that are associated with one of five ranges: 0-4,999; 5,000-9,999; 10, 000-14,999; 15,000-19,999; and 20,000-24,999 .
The lowest point accumulation range in the 2010 cycle serves as the reference level. The departure week fixed effects, η, in this specification are defined to be common across the two years.
24 This specification allows us to examine whether the behavioral changes we document reset when the consumer transitions from the end of one point-earning cycle to the beginning of another. 23 We aggregate flight segments to the route level by averaging across the flights in the same booking. Other aggregation methods, such as summation, would bias connecting versus direct flights. For about 1% of the observations, ab f = 0 and therefore advbook is undefined. As reported in Table 4 , the average member in our sample books 31% earlier than others on the same flight. The co-existence of this pattern with the observation that members on average pay more than the median is possible because i) prices vary non-linearly with advance booking, and ii) prices also vary due to other factors.
24 Because the 2011 point-earning cycle begins with the New Year for the majority of the members, if we control for year-specific week fixed effects, any reset in behavior would be absorbed by those controls.
Similarly, we investigate willingness to pay responses with the following specification: is ahead or behind compared to a steady progress, it allows us to observe the extent to which the individual's pattern of behaviors reverse from the end of one point earning cycle to the beginning of another. There are two main takeaways. First, these results parallel those based on progress: Consumers become more willing to book trips with the airline at higher prices and on markets where the airline does not offer the most appealing flight options as they get closer to achieving their goal. Second, consumers display significant resets in their behavior, going from the end of one point earning cycle to the beginning of another. This result suggests that the increase in their switching costs reverses once the point accumulation period refreshes, which is consistent with an account of forward-looking consumers. Importantly, this result adds further support to the notion that our findings are not driven by changes in consumer behavior due to spurious serial correlation, or state dependency arising from cumulative experience or habit formation with the airline.
Robustness of results to using different subsamples
In Table A1 of the Appendix, we provide several replications of our main results using different subsamples to check robustness of our results to imprecisely constructed statistics, outliers and/or punch code errors in the data. Column 1 presents a replication of results from Specification 1 after eliminating DB1B statistics that are based fewer than 50 passengers on a route, or 10 passengers on TA. In Columns 2 and 3, we replicate Specification 2 after eliminating bookings that are associated with a median price statistic based on fewer than 10 observations. Columns 4-6 present replications of results from Specifications 1 and 2 after dropping the lower and upper 1% of the distribution of our constructed dependent variables. Given the disparity between coach and first-class prices, and the fact that almost all bookings are in the coach class, we used of a subsample of coach-class bookings for our willingness to pay analyses. In the Appendix, Columns 7-8
of Table A1 present replications of results based on Specification 2 based on the sample of all bookings.
Bookings with revenues lower than $15 account for 0.4% of the observations in our sample. Columns 9-10 of Table A1 present replications after eliminating these bookings.
We also repeat our analyses for different groups of members. Columns 1-4 of Table A2 present replications of our main results based on a subsample of members who achieved 15,000 status qualifying points in either 2010 or 2011. These members are more likely to see tier 1 as an attainable goal, and less likely to be motivated by miles accumulation for free tickets than members who obtain fewer points on a regular basis.
Because the analyses based on accumulated points has to focus on a subsample of members who achieved were active in both years, Columns 5-8 of Table A2 present replications based on the progress metric for this subsample.
Our results replicate across all of these robustness checks: Members become more willing to fly with the airline over its competition, more willing to pay higher prices and book on TA.com, and more likely to book business trips.
Preference Heterogeneity
The fact that business and leisure travelers have different purchasing patterns has been widely recognized in the airline industry. In this section, we examine whether leisure and business travelers differ in the extent to which they modify their purchase behaviors as they stretch to attain status. We characterize a traveler based on his/her travel patterns. To explore the degree to which business and leisure travelers differ in their responses to making progress towards attaining status, we extend Specifications 1 and 2 to allow for response heterogeneity:
where β sk reflects heterogeneous responses of different segments of members. We posit that a member is more likely to be a leisure (business) traveler if more of her bookings span (do not span) Saturday night. We specify two versions of response heterogeneity. In the first version, we define two (discrete) segments based on members' propensity to travel for business. A member belongs to Segment 1 if her propensity to make bookings that do not span a Saturday night, labeled as BizP erc i , is larger than or equal to 1/2. She belongs to Segment 2 otherwise. In this version, the response parameters are defined as:
, where σ k captures the differential response of travelers who book business trips more than 50% of the time. In the second version, we allow heterogeneous responses to vary continuously with the member's propensity to travel for business. In particular, we define β sk = β k + σ k BizP erc i , where σ k captures the marginal difference in a member's response with respect to a her business travel propensity. Table 7 reports the coefficients from these two versions. Columns 1-3 presents results from the discrete specification and Columns 4-6 presents results from the continuous specification of heterogeneity. We find significant differences across segments in their willingness to pay responses. Looking at the σ parameter estimates in Column 2 and 3, we see that Segment 1 members (business travelers) increase the relative price they pay more aggressively as they make progress towards status. While Segment 2 members (leisure travelers) also show an increase, this response is more muted. Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots the coefficients in Column 3. When members' progress levels are within the reach of the required pace to attain status (when k = 6), Segment 2 consumers increase the differential price they pay per mile by 0.9 cents (β 6 ), whereas Segment 1 consumers increase it by 3.3 cents (β 6 + σ 6 ). Columns 5-6 repeat these analyses with the continuous heterogeneity specification. Again, we see that travelers with higher shares of business travel Table 7 .
increase the relative price they pay more aggressively as they make progress towards status. Overall, the results suggest that a large majority of the willingness to pay increase we observe can be ascribed to business travelers.
In contrast, we do not find meaningful differences across business and leisure travelers in the extent to which they become more willing to choose TA on routes where it is less appealing: the σ estimates are mostly insignificant (Column 1 and Column 4 of Table 7 ). To make the contrast explicit, panel (b) of Figure 4 plots the coefficients in Column 1. If we assume that the main effect of increased propensity of bookings on routes with lower TA appeal could be driven by people booking TA even when it offers inconvenient flight options, the lack of response heterogeneity in RM S can be explained by two (potentially co-existing) reasons. 25 First, even if business travelers value status benefits more, if they are more sensitive to inconvenience than leisure travelers are, they may not become differentially more willing to give up convenience in order to fly with TA compared to leisure travelers. Second, if the difference in business and leisure traveler responses are mainly due to the fact that the business travelers find it easier to stick with TA because their company is paying for their travel, a lack of difference in the willingness to inconvenience oneself makes sense, since whether the traveler or the company pays for the ticket does not change the cost the traveler endures from inconvenience.
In the next section, we tease apart the role of moral hazard from preference heterogeneity.
Role of Moral Hazard
Airlines have been suspected of taking advantage of misaligned incentives between travelers and their employers by offering benefits to travelers for their business, which are bought at the expense of the employer.
Shugan summarizes this view: "These situations can induce potential agency problems when so-called loyalty programs target the decision rather than the payer. These programs might provide direct de facto side payments (akin to the original concept of "kickbacks") to decision makers." (Shugan, 2005, p.189) . Of course, this concern is not specific to the airline industry. Moral hazard could be present in other purchase decisions that employees make and employers pay for, such as hotels, car rentals and office equipment, etc.
Speaking to these areas, Basso et al. (2009) state "we think it is no coincidence that these very large loyalty programs exist in areas in which a large fraction of purchases are work related." (Basso et al., 2009; p.117) .
These authors call for empirical evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is a driver of behavior in loyalty programs.
In this section, we examine the extent to which moral hazard enables the response of travelers to status incentives. To motivate our analyses, we discuss two pieces of evidence we have presented in earlier sections as smoking gun evidences for the role of moral hazard. The first smoking gun evidence arises from our results regarding advance booking time. Our results suggest that members become more likely to book with the TA closer to their departure time as they make progress towards attaining status. As we discussed in Section 3.3, business trips tend to be booked closer to the departure time. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether members are becoming more likely to book business trips as they make progress towards their status goal.
Column 4 of Table 5 presents results from an estimation of Specification 1 where the dependent variable is the indicator for whether the trip spans a Saturday night (proxy for leisure travel). The results show that members become up to 10% more likely to book trips that do not span a Saturday night (i.e. a business trip)
as they progress towards their goal. This result could be driven by one of two behavioral changes. First, members may become more likely to prefer TA over its competition when traveling for business than when traveling for leisure. Second, members may become more likely to generate business trips that they would otherwise not have taken in order to accumulate points. These reasons, while empirically indistinguishable, both provide initial evidence for the role of moral hazard.
The second smoking gun evidence comes from our response heterogeneity results. We documented that business travelers more strongly increase their willingness to pay for TA compared to leisure travelers.
Because business travelers often do not pay for their travel expenses, the documented differences may suggest moral hazard. However, there are two other potential reasons for why business travelers have a more pronounced response in willingness to pay. First, business travelers may find tier 1 benefits to be more valuable than leisure travelers. Second, business travelers may be less price sensitive overall. These types of preference heterogeneity would predict business travelers' responsiveness to progress to be steeper and their baseline willingness to pay to be higher, even when they pay for their own travel. Therefore, we need to tease apart the role of moral hazard from preference heterogeneity across types of travelers.
An ideal test of moral hazard would detect differences in an individual's response to progress based on who is paying for her travel. Such within-person changes in the response to progress are predicted by the moral hazard hypothesis, but cannot be explained by preference heterogeneity, since the person making the booking is the same. The rich panel nature of the data provides us a unique opportunity to get close to this ideal test. We cannot observe whether the traveler is paying for the ticket herself with certainty, but we find it reasonable to assume that one is more likely to pay out of own pocket for leisure trips than for business trips. Therefore, we offer a test for moral hazard by examining whether the same individual becomes more willing to stick with TA when booking business trips than when bookings leisure trips, as she gets closer to status. In particular, we estimate the following specification for detecting changes in route selection:
Similarly, we estimate the following specification for detecting changes in paid prices:
where w ∈ B, L indexes the purpose of the booking: Leisure or Business. We classify a trip to be leisure when it contains a Saturday-night stay-over. Person and trip purpose specific fixed effects (α iw ) control for each member's average willingness to pay for leisure and for business travel. Individual response parameters, β ik , capture how strongly each member responds to progress when booking a leisure trip at progress level k.
Finally, µ k capture the degree to which the same member's response to progress is more pronounced when she is booking a business trip rather than a leisure trip. We estimate Specifications 7 and 8 using a roundtrip subsample of members who booked at least 2 leisure and 2 business trips. This is because 1) the estimation compares within-member change in route popularity/paid prices when booking business trips and leisure trips separately, and 2) whether a trip spans Saturday night can only be defined for roundtrip bookings.
We interpret parameters µ as reflecting the impact of moral hazard separately from the impact of preference heterogeneity, after controlling for individual differences in the differential price paid for leisure versus business travel (α iw ) and individual differences in response to progress (β ik ). Admittedly, the Saturday-night proxy for leisure trip is noisy, which may bias µ towards zero. Thus, a significant µ would be a conservative indicator that members respond to status incentives differently based on whether they are paying for the trip themselves or not.
Moral hazard contributes to a substantial increase in members' willingness to pay more as they make progress towards status. As is shown in Column 1 of Table 8 (DV = relative price differential) and Table   9 (DV=price differential per mile), the estimated µ's are positive across the board, after controlling for preference heterogeneity in the most flexible manner with member-specific intercepts (α iw ) and slopes (β ik ).
For example, when the member's progress is just within reach of the pace required to attain status (k=6), she pays 6.8% more (Table 8 , Column 1, µ 6 ), or alternatively 1.85 cents more per mile (Table 9 , Column 1, µ 6 ) when she is booking a business trip rather than a leisure trip. Note that this additional willingness to pay is above and beyond the usual price difference she pays for business versus leisure trips (captured by α iw ). It is also on top of the overall increase in her willingness to pay due to her current level of progress (captured by β i6 ). Given the all-positive µ's, we conclude that on average members' willingness to pay response to increased progress is higher when someone else is likely paying for these members' trips.
We offer a back-of-the-envelope calculation to illustrate the magnitude of moral hazard. In particular,
we can compare the overall increase in the willingness to pay to the increase arising from moral hazard.
For drawing appropriate comparisons, Table A3 in the Appendix replicates our main findings and our heterogeneity results for the subsample roundtrip bookings of members with at least two leisure and two business bookings. For illustration purposes, we compare estimates of β 6 (10%) from Column 2 of Table   A3 , and µ 6 (6.8%) from Column 1 of Table 8 . In this subsample, 51% of the bookings are characterized as business trips. Therefore, the contribution of moral hazard to increased willingness to pay on bookings overall can be approximated as 3.4% = 51% * 6.8% at this level of progress. This suggests that moral hazard accounts for about 34% (
3.4%
10% ) of the overall price inflation due to members' stretching to attain status. However, from the perspective of the employer who pays for the business trips, moral hazard accounts for 68% of increased expenditures due to their employees' willingness to spend more to attain status. Moral hazard in air travel due to status incentives has a substantial impact on a company's bottomline: If it were not for moral hazard, companies would be spending about 7% less on airfare.
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Given the importance of moral hazard in willingness to pay responses, the reader may wonder how much of the difference we document across business and leisure member segments are due to moral hazard versus preference heterogeneity. To provide an answer to this question, we extend Specifications 5 and 6 as:
and
where segment level heterogeneity is either specified discretely, β sk = β k + σ k 1(Segment i = 1), or continuously, β sk = β k + σ k BizP erc i . These specifications allow us to compare the contribution of crosssegment heterogeneity we documented in the previous section to the contribution of within-member variation in responses due to moral hazard. Columns 2-4 of Table 8 and Table 9 present estimates of β k , σ k and µ k where β sk = β k + σ k 1(Segment i = 1). These parameters capture the baseline response to progress, how this response differs for members in Segment 1 (business travelers), and how it differs within a person based on the purpose of the trip, respectively. Columns 5-7 present estimates from the specifications where β sk = β k + σ k BizP erc i , so σ reflect how response to progress differs across people based on the frequency of their business travel.
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Based on these estimates, we conduct additional back-of-the-envelope calculations to compare the impact 26 We say about 7% because µ 4 − µ 7 hover around this magnitude and because business travelers' progress on average falls in S 4 .
27 Specifications 7 and 8 have the advantage of fully controlling for individual heterogeneity. Therefore, these specifications offer the most precise measurement of moral hazard. However, because β ik parameters are estimated at the individual level, they are not reported. Therefore, we find these extensions useful in comparing i) cross-segment heterogeneity -the crossmember variation that cannot be teased apart from preference heterogeneity -and, ii) within-member variation in responses as a function of trip purpose.
of moral hazard to that of preference heterogeneity in explaining the response variation we documented in the previous section. For illustration purposes, we focus on comparing estimates of β 6 , σ 6 and µ 6 . Consider two extreme members, one who almost always flies for business and the other one who almost always flies for leisure. When the member's progress is just within reach of the pace required to attain status (k = 6), estimates presented in Columns 5-7 of Table 8 suggest that the business traveler pays 14.4% more than the leisure traveler (β 6 + µ 6 ). If it were not for moral hazard, this difference would only be 9.1% (β 6 ). So, moral hazard accounts for about 1/3 of the difference in their willingness to pay response. This comparison generalizes to less extreme examples as well.
Overall, moral hazard is a significant contributor to the increased willingness to pay in response to progress, but not to the increased willingness to take TA on routes where is has a lower relative market share (see Table 10 for the estimates). Regardless of how we define preference heterogeneity, estimates of µ are insignificant. It is important to point out that this result is entirely congruent with moral hazard, since the consumer is inconvenienced just the same regardless of who pays for the ticket.
Conclusion
Airlines may have several purposes for their frequent-flyer programs, including price discrimination, creating behavioral loyalty by increasing switching costs and taking advantage of moral hazard between employers and business travelers. In this paper, we show that progress towards status attainment leads to significant increases in consumer switching costs. We document that on average frequent-flyer members increase their willingness to pay by up to 8% or 2 cents per mile when stretching to attain status. Conservative calculations suggest a $820 million increase in travel expenditures each year due to people's increased willingness to fly with the sponsor airline.
28 Business travelers' willingness to increase expenditure to attain status is much stronger than that of leisure travelers. We argue that moral hazard has a large impact on the extent to which members increase their willingness to pay to attain status. Our estimates suggest that if moral hazard could be eliminated companies could save about 7% on their travel costs. These results lend novel empirical support to a large body of theoretical work on frequent-flyer programs that have highlighted these aspects, and elucidate the magnitude of the impact these aspects have on the marketplace.
While the financial expenditures driven by switching costs induced by status incentives already seem substantial, for three reasons, we are likely to be underestimating the total impact. First, the estimated increases in the willingness to pay do not completely reflect the financial impact of the increased willingness to travel with the airline over other transportation options. The fact that we only observe bookings with TA precludes us from quantifying how many bookings would not be made with TA if it were not for members' desire to attain status. Second, in our analyses we cannot directly make use of consumers' beliefs about their chances of attaining status, but proxy for these expectations using their timely progress towards the point threshold over time. The noisiness of this proxy may create substantial measurement error, biasing our results towards zero. Eliciting beliefs about future travel and attainment of status, while tracking purchases over time, may help remedy this issue. Third, and more fundamentally, we can only speak to how consumers respond to changes in progress. Clearly, having a goal of attaining status may have an overall impact on consumers' purchase behaviors, even at the beginning of a point-earning cycle. The overall impact can be estimated if the behavior of consumers before and after the introduction of these status incentives could be observed. We hope that future research will be able to remedy these shortcomings and measure the total impact of frequent-flyer programs in general, and status incentives in particular, on consumers' purchase behaviors.
It would be remiss not to mention an important change in the status qualification requirements in this industry since the period of our data. Delta added minimum spending thresholds for elite status tiers in January 2014, United in March 2015, and American Airlines in August, 2016. These changes may have been responses to the observation that incremental sales arising from status incentives are more likely to be on shorter and cheaper routes that gave travelers a relatively high boost in miles per dollar spent. Based on our findings in Section 5, we predict that this new policy will further help airlines take advantage of moral hazard. Under the new regime, road warriors flying on the company's dime not only will keep diverting business from competitors to their preferred airline, but they will also be incentivized to book full-priced tickets and/or to unnecessarily delay their bookings to meet the new spending requirements. In contrast, leisure travelers may no longer find stretching to attain status a worthwhile goal under the new regime.
Therefore, the airline market may experience a further bifurcation between legacy and low cost carriers, Summary statistics are based on all booking observations in our sample data. The top and middle panels report summary statistics from the TA database. The bottom panel reports summary statistics of booking characteristics that are constructed using the DB1B dataset. Therefore, they are only associated with domestic bookings. In parentheses, we report robust standard errors clustered at the member level. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1 and 4 report estimates from Specification 1 with the dependent variable as indicated. Columns 2 and 3 report estimates from Specification 2. The subsamples for the regressions differ. RM S is defined only for domestic bookings where TA has competition on the route. Saturday indicator is only defined for roundtrips. Specification 2 is estimated using only coach-class bookings. In parentheses, we report robust standard errors clustered at the member level. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report estimates from Specification 1 with the dependent variable as indicated. Columns 5 and 6 report estimates from Specification 2 with the additional advbook control added as an explanatory variable. Columns 4-6 are estimated using coach-class bookings. The number of observations in Columns 5 and 6 are slighly lower due to advbook not being well-defined for some observations. markuo is defined only for domestic bookings where TA has competition on the route. Relative Direct Service Ratio is only well-defined for domestic routes on which at least one carrier provides direct service. Indirect Strong is only well-defined for indirect bookings on domestic routes. Obs. 20, 319, 862 23, 941, 499 23, 941, 499 20, 319, 862 23, 941, 499 23, 941 In parentheses, we report robust standard errors clustered at the member level. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1 and 4 report estimates from Specification 5. Other columns report estimates from Specification 6. RM S is defined only for domestic bookings where TA has competition on the route. Specification 2 is estimated using only coach-class bookings. 
Tables

Routes
We construct routes by connecting segments that are booked on the same date and depart on the same date in terms of their origin and destination markets. Several airports may serve large metro areas, such as Chicago, New York City, or the Bay Area. T-100 data, maintained by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, provides metro area codes for each airport. We use this data to define the origin and destination markets for each segment. Routes consisting of one segment account for 40% of segment bookings. In these cases, the origin and destination of the route is the same as that of the segment, and the route is labeled as direct. Routes consisting of two segments account for 55% of segment bookings, and almost all of them can be connected by matching the destination of one segment with the origin of the other. The majority of these routes are labeled as indirect, because they involve more than one segment. However, 3% of two-segment routes loop back to the origin on the same day. These itineraries are broken down to their outbound and inbound direct routes, and these routes are labeled as direct roundtrip itineraries. Because our analyses are blind to the direction of travel, we are agnostic to which of the two routes are labeled as the outbound one.
The remaining 5% of the data almost entirely correspond to indirect routes consisting of three or four segments. In 9% of these cases, the segment bookings loop back to the origin on the same day. However, unlike in cases where there are only two segments, we cannot determine the endpoints of the route. For example, consider the following set of segment bookings on the same day: ORD-DEN, DEN-LGA, LGA-ORD. It is unclear whether the endpoints of this roundtrip were DEN-ORD or DEN-LGA or ORD-LGA. Therefore, we label these routes as "undefined". Because the origin and the destination of these bookings are undefined, undefined routes are not included in the analyses that examine changes to route characteristics. However, they contribute to a member's point accumulation. In less than 0.5% of the cases, a consumer makes a booking involving more than four segments that depart on the same day. Most of these segments cannot be connected to form a route. We also label these routes as "undefined". Overall, less than 1% of the segments belong to undefined routes.
Itineraries
We identify itineraries by connecting routes that are booked on the same day based on their departure and arrival cities. The main purpose of identifying itineraries is to be able to define whether the route was part of a roundtrip itinerary, and whether travel spanned a Saturday night. We cannot classify one-way trips as spanning a Saturday night or not, because we do not observe when the member travels back, if she does.
In a large majority of the cases, constructing itineraries is straightforward, because the route bookings are ordered by departure dates, and the endpoints can be joined. However, in situations where there is an ambiguity regarding how to define trips, we make additional assumptions that prioritize identification of roundtrips over open-jaws, if both are possible. For example, on January 3, 2010 a member books the following routes (departure dates in parentheses): JFK-SFO (Jan 11), SFO-JFK (Jan 13), JFK-BWI (Feb 2), EWR-LAX (Feb 12), LAX, EWR (Feb 14). Our code identifies three itineraries (JFK-SFO-JFK, JFK-BWI and EWR-LAX-EWR), rather than two itineraries including an open-jaw (JFK-SFO-JFK-BWI and EWR-LAX-EWR).
A2. Data Construction, DB1B Database
The route level competitive price and quantity information comes from DB1B. The Airline Origin and Destination Survey Databank 1B (DB1B) is a 10% random sample of airline passenger tickets. The data are reported at the quarterly level. It consists of three tables: Coupon, market, and ticket. We use the coupon and ticket tables. The coupon table provides coupon-specific information for each domestic itinerary of the Origin and Destination Survey, such as the operating carrier, origin and destination airports, number of passengers, fare class, coupon type, trip break indicator, and distance. The ticket table contains summary characteristics of each domestic itinerary on the Origin and Destination Survey, including the reporting carrier, itinerary fare, number of passengers, originating airport, roundtrip indicator, and miles flown. The two tables are merged by itinerary identifiers. We use ticketing carrier as the airline identifier for each itinerary. Continental and United airlines, as well as Southwest and AirTran announced their merger in 2010. For consistency across the years that our data spans, we consider these pairs of airlines as combined entities from the beginning of 2010.
As other studies using the DB1B database, we define ticket fares as a one-way prices, and work with a robust sample of DB1B itineraries.
29 In particular, we eliminate itineraries that are not within the contiguous domestic U.S., if the fare is less than $10 (one-way) or above the 99th percentile of the route carrier fare distribution, or deemed by the BTS to be of questionable magnitude.
30 These data cleaning steps follow the previous literature (e.g., Dai et al., 2014; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009 ). We also eliminate carriers with less than 1,000 total passengers in the database. These steps drop 8.7% of the itineraries in the DB1B database. Finally, in calculating market shares, we only consider a set of "active" carriers on a route, in order to omit coding errors from having an undue impact on the denominator when we calculate average market shares. In particular, we omit a carrier-route-quarter observation if the carrier has less than 1% market share on the route in that quarter.
A.3. Robustness Checks
We report results from several replications using different subsamples to check robustness of our results to imprecisely constructed statistics, outliers and/or punch code errors in the data. We also report replications based on different subsamples of the data.
Robust DB1B Market Shares
In an effort to eliminate possible coding errors in DB1B, Column 1 of Table A1 reports results from a reestimation of Specification 1 after eliminating observations from the data that we believe do not provide adequate coverage for a route: We drop any route-quarter with less than 50 passengers overall, or with less than 10 passengers on TA.
Robust TA Price Medians
We re-estimate Specification 2 after eliminating bookings that are possibly associated with an imprecise median price statistic on the route. We drop bookings if any segment on the route was booked on a flight with less than 10 passengers in the coach-class. Column 2 and 3 of Table A1 report the results.
Winsorizing Constructed Relative Metrics
Columns 4-6 of Table A1 report results from re-estimations of Specifications 1 and 2 after dropping the lower and upper 1% of the distribution of our constructed dependent variables.
Including First-Class Revenue Data
In the willingness to pay analyses presented in the main tex, we use only coach class bookings. In Columns 7-8 of Table A1 , we replicate our main results with the full dataset, including first-class bookings, by including an indicator in the regression that equals one if the booking includes a first-class ticket.
Excluding Revenues Lower than $15
In our main analyses, we include all positive route revenues, even though some are too small to conceivably reflect the full price of the ticket. Column 9-10 of Table A1 present results from a replication that (i) excludes revenues that are smaller than $15 or associated with upgrades or undefined ticket classes and (ii) redefines flight median prices based on this subsample.
Different Member Subsamples
Columns 1-5 of Table A2 present replications of our main results based on a subsample of members who achieved 15,000 status qualifying points in either 2010 or 2011. These members are more likely to see tier 1 as an attainable goal, and less likely to be motivated by miles accumulation for free tickets than members who obtain fewer points on a regular basis. Columns 6-10 of Table A2 present replications of our main results based on a subsample of members who achieved were active in both years. For ease of comparability, in Table A3 we replicate results from Specification 1 and 2, and their heterogenous extensions using the subsample of observations we employed in our moral hazard analyses. 19,299,699 22,231,282 22,231,282 19,942,793 23,572,996 23,485,551 24,862,350 24,862,350 23,941,222 23,941 
0.424
In parentheses, we report robust standard errors clustered at the member level. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1. In parentheses, we report robust standard errors clustered at the member level. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1. 
0.356
In parentheses, we report robust standard errors clustered at the member level. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1. 
